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Abstract
Traditional real options analysis addresses the problem of investment under uncertainty
assuming a risk-neutral decision maker and complete markets. In reality, however, decision
makers are often risk averse and markets are incomplete. We confirm that risk aversion
lowers the probability of investment and demonstrate how this effect can be mitigated
by incorporating operational flexibility in the form of embedded suspension and resumption
options. Although such options facilitate investment, we find that the likelihood of investing
is still lower compared to the risk-neutral case. Risk aversion also increases the likelihood
that the project will be abandoned, although this effect is less pronounced. Finally, we
illustrate the impact of risk aversion on the optimal suspension and resumption thresholds
and the interaction among risk aversion, volatility, and optimal decision thresholds under
complete operational flexibility.
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1 Introduction
Fluctuating global economic conditions require responsive strategies in order to ensure the
effectiveness of investment decisions. The withdrawal of Honda in 2008 from Formula One
(Financial Times, 2008), for instance, was made in light of the rapidly deteriorating conditions
facing the global auto industry and reflects the impact of the global financial and economic
crisis. Indeed, when market uncertainty increases and decision makers are risk averse, the
discretion to abandon, modify, or suspend existing projects becomes of greater importance. In
this paper, we examine the impact of such operational flexibility, in terms of being able to
suspend and resume the project at any time, on optimal investment policies and option values.
We analyze the case where the decision maker exhibits risk aversion and has perpetual options
to suspend and resume a project at no cost. Under these conditions, we address the question of
how investment decisions are affected by risk aversion, operational flexibility, and uncertainty.
Hence, the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we develop a theoretical framework for
investment under uncertainty with risk aversion and operational flexibility in order to derive
optimal investment and operational thresholds. Second, we show how risk aversion interacts
with operational flexibility to affect optimal investment policy. Third, we provide managerial
insights for operational decisions based on analytical and numerical results.
We proceed by discussing some related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we formulate
the problem using the nested optimal stopping time approach and a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function to determine the optimal time of investment that maximizes
the decision maker’s expected utility of future profits. The impact of operational flexibility, in
terms of having the ability to suspend and resume operations, is examined in Section 4. We
first analyze the case where the investment is irreversible (4.1) and then introduce operational
flexibility in the form of a single abandonment option (4.2), a combined suspension-resumption
option (4.3), and finally complete flexibility where the decision maker has an infinite number
of perpetual options to suspend and resume operations (4.4). Section 5 provides numerical
examples for each case and examines the effects of volatility and risk aversion on the optimal
investment, suspension, and resumption thresholds. We illustrate the interaction among risk
aversion, uncertainty, and operational flexibility and present managerial insights to enable more




Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986) address the problem of optimal
entry to and exit from a project assuming a risk-neutral decision maker with a perpetual
option to invest. This canonical real options problem can be solved via either the contingent
claims approach, assuming that either markets are complete or the project’s unique risk can
be diversified, or via dynamic programming, using a subjective discount rate. Contingent
claims analysis, however, cannot be used in cases where the project’s risk is not diversifiable.
This occurs, for example, in research and development (R&D) projects with technical risk
that is idiosyncratic, or in nascent markets that may not have sufficiently developed financial
instruments. Furthermore, the decision maker may be inherently risk averse due to the firm’s
ownership structure, e.g., in the case of a municipal authority or due to costs of financial distress.
Dynamic programming can then be used to maximize the expected discounted utility of the
lifetime profits of a risk-averse decision maker.
In the real options literature, different types of operational flexibility have been studied
mainly under the assumption of a risk-neutral decision maker. For example, Majd and Pindyck
(1987) analyze the flexibility that lies within the time it takes to build an investment project.
Their analysis is based on the fact that the rate at which the construction of an investment
project proceeds is flexible and can, therefore, be adjusted as new information becomes avail-
able. Applying contingent claims analysis, they show how traditional discounted cash flow
methods understate the value of the project by ignoring this flexibility. However, their analy-
sis is restricted by the assumptions of market completeness and a risk-neutral decision maker.
Dangl (1999) examines the flexibility that arises not only from the firm’s ability to wait for more
information, but also from the ability to adjust the capacity of the investment project. Thus,
under conditions of irreversible investment expenditures and uncertainty in future demand, he
addresses the problem of a firm that has to determine the optimal investment timing and the
optimal capacity choice. The flexibility to choose between two alternative investment projects of
different scales under output price uncertainty has been studied by Décamps, Mariotti and Vil-
leneuve (2006). Their analysis extends the results of Dixit (1993) where the irreversible choice
among mutually exclusive projects under output price uncertainty is considered. Nevertheless,
each of these papers assumes a risk-neutral decision maker.
Since the assumptions of risk neutrality and market completeness are not particularly rel-
evant to most real-life situations, it is important to examine the implications that arise when
these assumptions are relaxed. A utility-based framework has been adopted, for example, by
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Henderson and Hobson (2002), who extend the real options approach to pricing and hedging
assets by taking the perspective of a risk-averse decision maker facing incomplete markets.
Their analysis is based on Merton (1969) who studies a decision maker facing complete markets
seeking to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth over a fixed and continuous time
horizon using a CRRA utility function. Henderson and Hobson (2002) extend Merton’s analysis
by introducing a second risky asset on which no trading is allowed. In that case, the decision
maker has a claim on units of the non-traded asset, and the question is how to price and hedge
this random payoff. Furthermore, Henderson (2007) investigates the impact of risk aversion and
incompleteness on investment timing and option value by a risk-averse decision maker with an
exponential utility function who can choose at any time to undertake an irreversible investment
project and receive a risky payoff. To offset some of the risk associated with the unknown
investment payoff, the decision maker also trades in a risk-free bond and a risky asset that is
correlated with the investment payoff. Results indicate that the higher the decision maker’s
risk aversion or the lower the correlation between the project value and hedging asset, the lower
will the investment threshold and option value be. In particular, there is a parameter region
within which the assumptions of complete and incomplete markets yield different results. In
this region, and under the assumption of complete markets, the option is never exercised (and
investment never occurs), whereas the decision maker exercises the option in the incomplete
setting.
More pertinent to our analysis is the working paper by Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), who
extend the work of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) by illustrating
how risk aversion affects investment under uncertainty when the decision maker faces incomplete
markets. Instead of using contingent claims, they use an optimal stopping time approach to
allow for the decision maker’s risk aversion to be incorporated via a CRRA utility function.
Their framework is based on a closed-form expression for the expected discounted utility of
stochastic cash flows derived by Karatzas and Shreve (1999). The results indicate that risk
aversion lowers the likelihood of investment and erodes the value of investment projects. In this
paper, we extend Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) by incorporating operational flexibility in the
form of suspension and resumption options that can be exercised at any time at no cost. We
will show how this flexibility can mitigate the effect of risk aversion and offer insights on how
to exercise optimally such suspension and resumption options.
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3 Problem Formulation and Assumptions
We assume that a risk-averse decision maker holds the perpetual option to invest in a project
that yields stochastic revenues over an infinite lifetime. Prior to investment, the decision maker’s
initial wealth is invested in a risk-free asset with rate of return r > 0. Let K be the amount
of wealth the decision maker gives up in order to cover the fixed and irrecoverable cost of
investment and c be the deterministic variable operating cost of the project. Thus, the present
value of these costs at the time of investment equals K + cr , which we assume is the decision
maker’s initial wealth. Also, time is continuous and denoted by t ≥ 0, and the value of the
project’s exogenous output price, Pt, follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) :
dPt = ¹Ptdt+ ¾PtdZt, P0 > 0 (1)
Here, ¹ is the growth rate, ¾ is the proportional variance, Zt is the standard Brownian motion,
and P0 is the initial value of the project’s output price. All values and rates are expressed
in real terms. The decision maker’s preferences are described by an increasing and concave
utility function, U(⋅). Hence, our analysis can accommodate hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
(HARA), constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility functions. To enable comparisons with Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), we apply the






1−° if ° ≥ 0 & ° ∕= 1
ln(Pt) if ° = 1
(2)
The relative risk aversion parameter, °, is restricted to [0, 1) for the purposes of our analysis
and reflects greater risk aversion as it increases.
We follow the framework of Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) for decomposing cash flows into
disjoint time intervals. We denote by P i¿j the output price at time ¿j , j = 1, 2, 3..., at which we
exercise an investment (j = 1), suspension (j = 2, 4, 6, ...), or resumption option (j = 3, 5, 7, ...)
when i = 0, 1, 2, 3... subsequent embedded options exist. For example, P 0¿1 is the price at which
we exercise an investment option without operational flexibility, P 0¿2 is the price at which we
exercise an abandonment option, and P 1¿2 is the price at which we exercise a suspension option
with a resumption option still available, etc. Suppose now that we have a perpetually operating
project that we start at random time ¿1. Thus, up to time ¿1, we earn an instantaneous cash
flow of c + rK per time unit with utility U(c + rK) discounted at our subjective rate of time
preference, ½ > ¹. Once we invest in the project, we swap this certain cash flow for a risky one,














Figure 1: Irreversible investment under risk aversion
Using the law of iterated expectations and the strong Markov property of the GBM process,
which states that price values after time ¿1 are independent of the values before ¿1 and depend






























e−½t [U (Pt)− U (c+ rK)] dt
]
(4)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash flows, discounted to ¿1. Here, EP0 denotes the
expectation operator, which is conditional on the initial value, P0, of the price process.
Now, we extend this framework by allowing for an abandonment option at random time
¿2 > ¿1. The value of the output price at which the option to abandon the project is exercised



















Figure 2: Investment under risk aversion with a single abandonment option
































is the expected utility of the project’s cash flows, discounted to ¿2.
Finally, we allow for a subsequent resumption option at random time ¿3 > ¿2. The output



























Figure 3: Investment under risk aversion with one suspension and one resumption option




































e−½t [U (Pt)− U (c)] dt
]
(8)
is the expected utility of the project’s cash flows, discounted to ¿3. Following the same reason-
ing, we can extend the model to include complete operational flexibility, i.e. infinitely many
suspension and resumption options.
4 Analytical Results
4.1 Investment without Operational Flexibility
Since this problem has already been examined by Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), we summarize
the results for ease of reference, to allow for comparisons, and to provide further insights.
Let F i¿j (⋅) denote the value of an option that is exercised at time ¿j , j = 1, 2, 3, ..., with
i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... subsequent embedded options remaining. F 0¿1(⋅) refers to an investment option
without operational flexibility, F 0¿2(⋅) refers to an abandonment option, while F 1¿2(⋅) refers to
a suspension with one resumption option, and so on. We define the value of the incremental
investment opportunity, F 0¿1(P0), as follows:












By S, we denote the set of stopping times of the filtration generated by the price process.





e−½tU(Pt)dt = AU(P0) (10)




¾2x(x− 1) + ¹x− ½ = 0 (11)





(Karatzas and Shreve, 1999), (9) can
be written as follows:











The first-order necessary condition (FONC) for this unconstrained maximization problem may
be expressed as follows:
¯2




+ (c+ rK)1−° = 0 (13)
Therefore, under a CRRA utility function, the optimal investment threshold is:
P 0∗¿1 = (c+ rK)
[





The second-order sufficiency condition (SOSC) requires the objective function to be concave at
P 0∗¿1 , which we show in Proposition 4.1. All proofs can be found in the appendix.







> 1, this implies that P 0∗¿1 > c + rK. Thus, (14) implies that the
option to invest should be exercised only when the critical value, P 0∗¿1 , exceeds the amortized
investment cost, c+ rK, by a positive quantity. This, in turn, implies that uncertainty and risk
aversion drive a wedge between the optimal investment threshold and the amortized investment
cost. The size of this wedge, as we will show later, depends on the levels of uncertainty, risk
aversion, and operational flexibility.
Another way of expressing (13) is to relate the marginal benefit (MB) of waiting to invest

























The first term on the left-hand side of (15) is positive and represents the incremental project
value created by waiting until the price is higher. Multiplied by the discount factor, it is
a positive, decreasing function of the output price, as waiting longer enables the project to
start at a higher initial price; however, the rate at which this benefit accrues diminishes due
to the effect of discounting. The second term is positive and represents the reduction in the
MC of waiting to invest due to saved investment and operating cost. Together, these two terms
constitute the MB of delaying investment. The MC of waiting to invest on the right-hand side of
(15) is positive and reflects the opportunity cost of forgone cash flows discounted appropriately.
For low price values, it is worthwhile to postpone investment since the MB is greater than the
MC according to Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.1 The MB curve is steeper than the MC curve at P 0∗¿1 .
As risk aversion increases, the MC of waiting to invest decreases relatively more than the MB.
This happens because the MC consists entirely of risk cash flows and, therefore, is affected more
by risk aversion. As a result, the marginal utility of the investment’s payoff increases, thereby
increasing the incentive to postpone investment. This leads to Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 The optimal investment threshold is increasing with risk aversion.
Finally, for a fixed level of risk aversion, the optimal investment threshold increases as the
economic environment becomes more uncertain. This happens because greater uncertainty
causes the value of waiting to increase, which in turn increases the opportunity cost of investing.
Proposition 4.3 verifies this intuition.
Proposition 4.3 The optimal investment threshold is increasing with volatility.
4.2 Investment with a Single Abandonment Option
Here, the value of the investment opportunity is:















































The value of the output price at which we exercise the abandonment option is P 0¿2 , and the
































We solve this compound real options problem backward by first determining the optimal
abandonment threshold price, P 0∗¿2 . The FONC for this unconstrained maximization problem
is expressed as:
¯1




+ c1−° = 0 (18)
Solving (18) with respect to P 0∗¿2 , we obtain the following expression for the optimal abandon-
ment threshold:
P 0∗¿2 = c
[





To ensure the existence of a local maximum at P 0∗¿2 , the SOSC has to be verified.







< 1, (19) implies that P 0∗¿2 < c, i.e. the option to abandon operations
permanently should be exercised when the operating cost, c, exceeds the critical value, P 0∗¿2 ,
by a positive quantity. Hence, uncertainty and risk aversion again drive a wedge between the
critical value, P 0∗¿2 , and the operating cost, c. The size of this wedge is affected by volatility,
risk aversion, and operational flexibility.
In contrast to the previous section, we now express (18) by relating the MB from acceler-
ating abandonment of the project with the MC. Note that unlike in the investment stage, an























The left-hand side of (20) is the MB of accelerating abandonment and represents the recovery
of the operating cost from shutting down the project. This term is positive, indicating that
abandoning operations at a higher price level (i.e. more quickly) increases the expected util-
ity of the salvageable operating cost. The right-hand side of (20) is the MC of accelerating
abandonment. The first term corresponds to killing the revenues of the project at a higher
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price level, while the second term is also positive and corresponds to the increase in the MC
from speeding up abandonment. This term represents the increase in the opportunity cost
from waiting less, thereby forgoing information. As risk aversion increases, the decision maker
appears more willing to terminate operations and, thus, avoid potential losses as Proposition
4.5 states.
Proposition 4.5 The optimal abandonment threshold is increasing in risk aversion.
The behavior of the optimal abandonment threshold when the level of uncertainty changes
can be determined using the FONC with respect to ¾2. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6 The optimal abandonment threshold is decreasing in volatility.
Proposition 4.6 implies that the greater the uncertainty, the more reluctant the decision maker is
to abandon an active project. Intuitively, this happens because she would not want to abandon
the project due to a temporary downturn, which is more likely when volatility is higher.
By moving back to the investment stage, we now solve the decision maker’s investment
timing problem given the solution to the optimal exercise of the abandonment option:




















Substituting in P 0∗¿2 and applying the FONC to (21) leads to the following non-linear equation
that gives the optimal investment threshold:
¯2











By comparing (22) and (13), we can show that the optimal investment threshold decreases due
to the embedded abandonment option as follows:
Proposition 4.7 The optimal investment threshold when an abandonment option is available
is lower compared to an irreversible investment opportunity, ceteris paribus.
In order to illustrate Proposition 4.7, we express (22) by relating the MB of waiting to invest










































Compared to the case of investment without operational flexibility (15), the MB and MC
of delaying investment have now increased due to the additional terms on each side of (23).
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These terms are positive and correspond to the MB and MC from the embedded abandonment
option. In fact, the MC increases by more than the MB since, at abandonment, the expected
utility of the salvageable operating cost is greater than the expected utility of the forgone cash
flows. Thus, the marginal utility of the payoff from delaying investment decreases, thereby
increasing the incentive to invest. Intuitively, the abandonment option reduces the decision
maker’s insecurity since she can now terminate her investment in case the output price drops
significantly.
4.3 Investment with a Single Suspension and Resumption Option
With a single suspension and resumption option the value of the investment opportunity is:





























































Here, P 1¿2 is the threshold price at which we suspend the investment project. The last
term, F 1¿2(P
2
¿1), is the maximized value of the option to suspend a just-activated project with a












































to be the maximized value of the option to resume forever a







































We solve this compound real options problem backward by first determining the optimal
resumption threshold price. The FONC yields:
P 0∗¿3 = c
[





Differentiating (27) with respect to °, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4.8 The optimal resumption threshold is increasing with risk aversion.
Next, we step back to when the investment project is active in order to decide when to
suspend operations, i.e. sub-problem (25). Applying the FONC, we obtain the following non-
linear equation that gives the optimal suspension threshold:
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Proposition 4.9 The optimal suspension threshold is higher than the optimal abandonment
one.
To illustrate Proposition 4.9, we will examine the relationship between the MB from accelerating








































The left-hand side of (29) is the MB of accelerating suspension. The first term is the MB
of accelerating abandonment while the second term represents the MB from the embedded
resumption option. Since the latter term is positive, the MB of suspension has increased com-
pared to the case of abandonment in (20). The right-hand side of (29) is the MC of accelerating
suspension. The first two terms correspond to the MC of accelerating abandonment, while the
third term represents the MC from the embedded option to resume operations. Since this term
is always positive, it causes the MC of abandonment to increase. Although both the MB and
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MC increase due to the embedded resumption option, the former increases relatively more since
at resumption, the expected utility of the risky cash flows is greater than the expected utility
of the operating cost. Thus, the marginal utility of the payoff from suspending operations
increases, which in turn increases the incentive to suspend operations. As a result, MB and
MC curves intersect at a higher level of the output price, thereby indicating that the embed-
ded resumption option facilitates suspension. Intuitively, the decision maker is more willing to
suspend operations since now, unlike in the case of permanent abandonment, she can recover
the lost cash flows by exercising her resumption option.




























The optimal investment threshold is obtained numerically by solving the following non-linear
equation resulting from the FONC:
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Proposition 4.10 The optimal investment threshold when a single suspension and a single
resumption option are available is lower than for an investment opportunity with a single aban-
donment option.
Intuitively, the suspension and resumption options facilitate investment because they provide
the decision maker the subsequent option to halt the project in case of a downturn and then
to resume it. Propositions 4.9 and 4.10 lead to the insight that additional flexibility facilitates
investment and operational decisions, thereby resulting in an increase of the optimal suspension
threshold and a decrease of the optimal investment threshold.
4.4 Investment with Complete Operational Flexibility
Following the methodology of McDonald (2006), suppose that we are now operating an invest-
ment project with infinitely many perpetual options to suspend and resume operations. The
symmetry of the problem suggests that the optimal values of the output prices at which these
options are exercised will not be affected by additional flexibility, i.e. each time we suspend or
resume operations, we still have infinitely many options left. Therefore, each resumption and
14
suspension threshold will be affected equally by flexibility. We let P∞¿e , where e stands for even
(i.e. 2,4,6,...), denote the common threshold at which all suspension options are exercised, and
P∞¿o , where o stands for odd (i.e. 3,5,7,...), denote the common threshold at which all resump-






















































































Therefore, the decision maker’s problem in an active state is:
F∞¿e (P
∞
























It follows that the option to resume a currently suspended project with infinitely many resump-
tion and suspension options, given that the current value of the output price is P∞¿e , is:
F∞¿o (P
∞








In order to solve for P∞∗¿1 , P
∞∗
¿o , and P
∞∗
¿e , we first substitute (34) into (35) and use as an initial
guess for P∞¿e the price at which the option to abandon the investment project is exercised,
i.e. P∞¿e = P
0∗
¿2 . Thus, we obtain an equation, which we then maximize with respect to P
∞
¿o .
The estimate of P∞¿o we obtain this way is then substituted into (34), which we maximize
with respect to P∞¿e . This procedure is iterated until each solution converges. As we will
demonstrate numerically in Section 5.4, the optimal suspension and resumption thresholds
converge toward the operating cost c. Intuitively, each time that additional flexibility becomes
available, the optimal suspension threshold increases and the optimal resumption threshold
decreases. Assuming that P i¿2j < c and P
i
¿2j+1 > c, ∀ i < ∞ and ∀ j = 1, 2, 3, ..., this implies
that limi→∞ P i¿2j = c and limi→∞ P
i
¿2j+1 = c, ∀j.












as given and solve the investment
problem for investment threshold P∞¿1 assuming investment cost K:
























5.1 Investment without Operational Flexibility
Suppose we have a project with K = $100, c = $10, ¾ ∈ [0, 0.2], and P0 = $13.6. We set
r = ½ = 0.05 and ¹ = 0.01. Figure 4 shows that the investment threshold, P 0∗¿1 , increases in
risk aversion ° for a fixed volatility, ¾. This happens because the underlying expected utility
of the project decreases with °, thereby raising the required threshold for investment. Hence,
increased risk aversion reduces the incentive to invest. Second, P 0∗¿1 increases in ¾ for fixed °
because greater uncertainty increases the value of waiting and, thus, the opportunity cost of
investing.
































































Figure 4: Optimal investment threshold versus ° for ¾ = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 (left), and optimal
investment threshold versus ¾ for ° = 0, 0.25, 0.5 (right).
Figure 5 illustrates the MB and MC of waiting to invest, for ¾ = 0.2 and ° = 0, 0.25. For
low prices it is worthwhile to postpone investment as the MB is greater than the MC. As risk
aversion increases, the MC, which consists entirely of risky cash flows and, hence, gets affected
more by risk aversion, decreases by more than the MB. As a result, the marginal utility of the
payoff when investment is delayed increases, which, in turn, decreases the incentive to invest
and causes the optimal investment threshold to increase with risk aversion.
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MC of Delaying Investment
Optimal Investment Threshold
Figure 5: Marginal benefit versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion,
° = 0.25, (right) for an irreversible investment opportunity
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of volatility, ¾, and risk aversion, °, on the value of the
option to invest and the value of the project. In the graph on the left, we plot the value of
the project as well as the option value for ¾ = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 holding ° = 0.25. As uncertainty
increases, the project value decreases, but the value of the option to invest, evaluated at the
initial level of the output price, increases due to greater waiting value. Consequently, the value
of the option to wait also increases, thereby delaying investment. In the graph on the right,
we plot the value of the project and the option value for ° = 0, 0.25, 0.5 holding ¾ = 0.2. The
graph indicates that as risk aversion increases, the decision maker requires a higher price before
exercising the option to invest. This is due to the decreased expected utility of the project,
which decreases both the value of the option to invest and the likelihood of investment.
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γ = 0.5 
γ = 0.25 
Figure 6: Option value and project value versus Pt for ° = 0.25 and ¾ = 0, 0.15, 0.2 (left), and
option value and project value versus Pt for ¾ = 0.2 and ° = 0, 0.25, 0.5 (right)
5.2 Investment with a Single Abandonment Option
Increasing flexibility by adding an abandonment option decreases the optimal investment thresh-
old. The proportional increase in option value due to the subsequent abandonment option is
larger for higher levels of uncertainty and risk aversion. Both of these results are illustrated
in Figure 7. In the graph on the left, we compare the case of investment without operational
flexibility to that of investment with a single abandonment option. We plot the value of the
project and the value of the investment opportunity for ° = 0.25 and ¾ = 0.2. The graph
on the right illustrates how the proportional increase in option value due to the subsequent
abandonment option fluctuates with risk aversion for three levels of volatility.
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Figure 7: Effect of the abandonment option on optimal investment threshold and option value
Although both risk aversion and uncertainty increase the option value of abandonment,
the impact of each factor on P 0∗¿2 is different. While risk aversion precipitates abandonment
due to a decrease in project value, uncertainty delays abandonment because it increases its
opportunity cost. In particular, Figure 8 indicates that as risk aversion increases, for a fixed
level of volatility, the decision maker becomes more willing to abandon the project in order to
avoid potential losses. An increase in uncertainty, however, leads to a decrease in the optimal
abandonment threshold.






























































Figure 8: Optimal abandonment threshold versus ° for ¾ = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 (left), optimal aban-
donment threshold versus ¾ for ° = 0, 0.25, 0.5 (right)
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For large price values, the MB of accelerating abandonment is less than the MC, and,
therefore, it is optimal to continue, as Figure 9 illustrates. As risk aversion increases, both the
MB and MC of accelerating abandonment decrease. However, the MC, which consists entirely
of risky cash flows and therefore gets affected more by risk aversion, decreases relatively more.
As a result, the marginal utility of the payoff from accelerating abandonment increases, which,
in turn, increases the incentive to abandon the project and results in an increased optimal
abandonment threshold.
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Figure 9: Marginal benefit versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion,
° = 0.25, (right) for an irreversible abandonment opportunity
Using the same parameter values as in Section 5.1, we plot the MB and MC of waiting to
invest versus Pt. The embedded abandonment option causes the marginal utility of the payoff
from delaying investment to decrease, which, in turn, increases the incentive to invest. This
happens because the MC increases relatively more than the MB, and as a result, the MB and
MC curves intersect at a lower level of P 1∗¿1 , as Figure 10 illustrates.
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Figure 10: Marginal benefit versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion,
° = 0.25 (right) for an investment opportunity with an embedded abandonment option
5.3 Investment with a Single Suspension and a Single Resumption Option
Having the option to suspend operations combined with an option to resume them permanently
increases the value of the investment opportunity further and decreases the optimal investment
threshold as Figure 11 illustrates. Moreover, the percentage increase in option value due to
the subsequent resumption option is greater compared to the case of investment with a single
abandonment option.
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Investment with Suspension and Resumption
σ = 0.15  
σ = 0.1  
σ = 0.2  
Figure 11: Effect of the resumption option on optimal investment threshold and option value
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In Figure 12, we illustrate the impact of the additional resumption option on the MB and
MC of waiting to invest. The embedded resumption option increases the MC relatively more
than the MB, and, as a result, the marginal utility of the payoff decreases further, thereby
increasing the incentive to invest. Thus, the MB and MC curves intersect at a lower level of
the output price, compared to the case of investment with abandonment.
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Figure 12: Marginal benefit versus marginal cost under risk neutrality (left) and risk aversion,
° = 0.25, (right) for an investment opportunity with a suspension and resumption option
Interestingly, the results also indicate that the decision maker is less willing to suspend
operations as the level of risk aversion increases. This outcome may seem counterintuitive,
but it can be explained by the fact that as risk aversion increases, the following two opposing
effects take place. First, the marginal utility of accelerating suspension increases with risk
aversion, thereby increasing the likelihood of suspension. This happens because the MC of the
abandonment option decreases faster with risk aversion than the MB. Second, the marginal
utility of delaying resumption from a suspended state increases with risk aversion, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of resumption. Here, the MC of the embedded resumption option
decreases faster than the MB. Thus, higher risk aversion reduces the marginal value of the payoff
from the resumption option, which makes suspension less attractive. Under the assumption of
costless suspension and resumption and for the values of the parameters used here, we observe
that the impact of risk aversion on the embedded resumption option dominates and postpones
the suspension of the project. Figure 13 illustrates the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty
on the optimal suspension threshold. The graph on the left indicates that as risk aversion
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increases, the wedge between the MB of suspension and the MB of abandonment decreases,
thereby indicating that the impact of risk aversion on the embedded resumption option is more
profound and results in the decreased likelihood of suspension. On the other hand, as in the
previous section, the likelihood that the project will be suspended decreases with uncertainty
since the decision maker is inclined to wait for uncertainty to be resolved before exercising the
suspension option.
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Figure 13: MB and MC of abandonment versus MB and MC of suspension for ¾ = 0.2 (left),
and MB of suspension versus MC of suspension for ° = 0.25 and ¾ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.15 (right)
Also interesting is that by allowing a further abandonment option after resumption, the
aforementioned counterintuitive result is no longer observed. Due to the additional abandon-
ment option, the marginal utility of the payoff from the option to suspend operations increases
faster with risk aversion than in the case of suspension with a subsequent option of perma-
nent resumption. In particular, the rate of this increase is greater than the rate at which the
marginal utility of the payoff from the embedded call option increases. Hence, the impact of
risk aversion on the embedded suspension and abandonment options is now greater than that
on the single resumption option and, thus, causes the likelihood of suspension to increase with
risk aversion. In fact, we observe that the impact of risk aversion on an optimal suspension
threshold dominates when the number of subsequent options to suspend operations exceeds the
number of the options to resume them.
Figure 14 summarizes the impact of operational flexibility and risk aversion on the optimal
decision thresholds. The direction of the arrows indicates greater operational flexibility. Here,
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additional flexibility facilitates all operational decisions and causes the optimal investment and
resumption thresholds to decrease and the optimal suspension threshold to increase. Meanwhile,
the impact of risk aversion on the optimal investment and operational thresholds diminishes as
additional flexibility becomes available.






























Figure 14: Impact of operational flexibility and risk aversion on optimal decision thresholds
5.4 Investment with Complete Operational Flexibility
In Figure 15, the left figure compares the case of investment with complete flexibility to that
of investment with a single suspension and a single resumption option for ¾ = 0.2 and ° =
0.25. Now, the ability to suspend and resume operations at any time increases the value of
the investment opportunity, which reduces further the investment threshold price. Also, the
proportional increase in option value is greater than that in the case of investment with a
single suspension and a single resumption option as the figure on the right illustrates. Finally,
according to the numerical results, the optimal suspension and optimal resumption thresholds
under complete flexibility are equal to the operating cost, c. Intuitively, additional flexibility
facilitates the suspension and resumption of the investment project and, as a result, causes the
optimal suspension threshold to increase and the optimal resumption threshold to decrease.
Assuming that no rational decision maker would exercise a suspension option at P i¿2j > c and
a resumption option at P i¿2j+1 < c, we can expect both of these thresholds to converge toward
the operating cost as additional flexibility becomes available. Thus, as i → ∞, we expect that
P i¿2j → c and P i¿2j+1 → c. Hence, the ability to suspend and resume operations costlessly at any
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time completely mitigates the impact of risk aversion and volatility on the optimal operational
thresholds and drives them to the same level as in the risk-neutral case.
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Figure 15: Impact of complete flexibility on the optimal investment threshold and option value
6 Conclusions
In a world of increasing economic uncertainty, the need to examine the interaction between
risk aversion and operational flexibility, so as to provide optimal investment and operational
decisions, is of great essence. In this paper, an effort is made to extend the results of McDonald
and Siegel (1985, 1986) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) to examine how investment and
operational decisions are affected by situations of uncertainty encountered by risk-averse deci-
sion makers. Although the impact of risk aversion has already been demonstrated in Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007), its implications when combined with operational flexibility have not been
thoroughly examined yet. Here, we develop the results regarding the problem of optimal in-
vestment under the assumption of risk aversion and operational flexibility assuming that the
decision maker faces incomplete markets. We demonstrate how operational flexibility facilitates
investment and operational decisions by increasing the likelihood of investment, suspension, and
resumption of the investment project. We show that risk aversion provides an incentive for de-
cision makers to delay the investment and resumption of the investment project and speed
up their decision to abandon it. Moreover, we describe how an environment of increasing un-
certainty may affect the optimal investment policy and lead to hysteresis. Also, we provide
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insights regarding the behavior of the optimal suspension threshold when the level of risk aver-
sion changes. Finally, we demonstrate how operational flexibility becomes more valuable as risk
aversion increases and the economic environment becomes more volatile.
Directions for further research could include the application of an alternative stochastic
process such as an arithmetic Brownian motion or a mean-reverting process, providing infor-
mation regarding the robustness of the numerical, theoretical, and intuitive results. Relaxing
the assumption of costless suspension and resumption may also provide further insights. In
addition to this, a different class of utility functions could be applied in order to obtain fur-
ther insight regarding the impact of risk aversion on the optimal investment policy and allow
for comparisons with the approach presented in this paper. Other aspects of the real options
literature, e.g. dealing with endogenous capacity (Dangl, 1999) and the time-to-build problem,
may also be investigated under the framework outlined in this paper.
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8 Appendix
Proposition 4.1: The objective function is strictly concave at P 0∗¿1 iff ° < 1.


































































The SOSC requires that
∂2F 01 (P 0∗¿1 )
∂P 0∗¿1



























1− ° < 0
⇔ 2¯1 + ° + 1
1− ° > 0 (40)
Notice that the numerator is positive, which implies that for the inequality to hold the denom-
inator needs to be positive as well. Hence, the SOSC is satisfied if and only if 0 ≤ ° < 1.
Corollary 4.1: The MB curve is steeper than the MC curve at P 0∗¿1 .





























































Simplifying (41) we have:
¯2(¯1 + °)(1− ° − ¯1)








Substituting for P 0∗¿1 leads to the following result:
2¯1 + ° + 1 > 0 (43)
This is true since, ¯1 > 1 and 0 ≤ ° < 1
Proposition 4.2: The optimal investment threshold is increasing with risk aversion.
Proof: Differentiating the optimal investment threshold, P 0∗¿1 , with respect to ° yields:
P 0∗¿1 = (c+ rK)
(




































> 0 ⇔ 1
(1− °)2 ln






¯2 + ° − 1 > 0
⇔ lnP 0∗¿1 − ln [c+ rK] >
1







1− ¯2 − °
⇔
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1− ¯2 − °
]
(45)
We will now show that (45) holds unconditionally, i.e., for all values of ¯2 and °.
[

















1− ¯2 − °
⇔ ln
[





1− ¯2 − °
⇔ ln
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1− ¯2 − ° + ¯2
1− ¯2 − °
⇔ ln
[




1− ¯2 − ° (46)
We now set x = −¯21−¯2−° > 0 ⇒ 1x =
1−¯2−°
−¯2 . Hence, we now need to show that:
− lnx > 1− x ⇔ lnx < x− 1 (47)
The equality lnx = x− 1 holds for ° = 1, which is not considered in this paper. To show that
inequality (47) holds, we first need to show that:
ex ≥ 1 + x, ∀x ∈ ℝ (48)













º→∞(1 + x) = 1 + x ⇒ e
x ≥ 1 + x ∀x ∈ ℝ (49)
Thus, we have shown that ex ≥ 1 + x, ∀x ∈ ℝ. Hence, assuming that x > 0 and using lnx
instead of x, we have:
elnx = x ≥ 1 + lnx ⇒ lnx ≤ x− 1 (50)
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Proposition 4.3: The optimal investment threshold is increasing with volatility.
Proof: Since ¯2 =
1







, substituting into the expression of the optimal
investment threshold we have:









⎝1 + ° − 1
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which is true. Hence, the last term in (52) is positive. Since the rest of the factors in (52) are




Proposition 4.4: The objective function is strictly concave at P 0∗¿2 iff ° < 1.









































































2 < 0 ⇔ ° < 1 (56)
Hence, the objective function is concave at P 0∗¿2 if and only if ° < 1.
Proposition 4.5: The optimal abandonment threshold is increasing with risk aversion.
Proof: Following the same steps as in Proposition 4.2 we have:
∂P 0∗¿2
∂°
> 0 ⇔ 1
(1− °)2 ln






¯1 + ° − 1 > 0























1− ¯1 − °
]
(57)
Again we will show that (57) holds for all values of ¯1 and °.
[

















1− ¯1 − °
⇔ ln
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¯1 + ° − 1
⇔ ln
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¯1 + ° − 1− ¯1
¯1 + ° − 1
⇔ ln
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¯1 + ° − 1 (58)
We now set x = ¯1¯1+°−1 . Thus, we need to show that lnx < x−1 which we have already shown
in Proposition 4.2 that holds.
Proposition 4.6: The optimal abandonment threshold is decreasing in volatility.
Proof: The optimal abandonment threshold is given by the following equation:
P 0∗¿2 = c
[





Substituting for ¯1, (59) takes the following expression:
P 0∗¿2 = c
⎡
⎣1 + ° − 1
1
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The latter is true, and, therefore, the last term of (61) is negative. Hence, since the first three




Proposition 4.7: The optimal investment threshold price when a single abandonment option
is available is less than that with an irreversible investment opportunity, ceteris paribus.
Proof: The FONCs that provide the optimal investment thresholds for the case of irreversible
investment and investment with a single abandonment option are:
¯2




+ (c+ rK)1−° = 0 (63)
¯2




+ (c+ rK)1−° +
¯2 − ¯1
¯1
½(1− °)F 0¿2(P 1∗¿1 ) = 0 (64)
Subtracting the two equations, we have:
P 0∗¿1
1−° − P 1∗¿1
1−°









¿1 ) > 0 the quantity on the right-hand side is positive. Hence:
P 0∗¿1
1−° − P 1∗¿1
1−°
> 0 ⇒ P 0∗¿1 > P 1∗¿1 (66)
Proposition 4.8: The optimal resumption threshold is increasing with risk aversion.
Proof: Similar to Proposition 4.2.
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Proposition 4.9: The optimal suspension threshold is higher than the optimal abandonment
one.
Proof: Comparing the two FONCs that provide the optimal abandonment and optimal sus-
pension thresholds, we have:
1























By subtracting the two equations we have:
P 1∗¿2
1−° − P 0∗¿2
1−°
=











¿2 ) ≥ 0 quantity on the right-hand side is positive. Therefore,
P 1∗¿2
1−° − P 0∗¿2
1−°
> 0 ⇒ P 1∗¿2 > P 0∗¿2 (70)
Proposition 4.10: The optimal investment threshold price when a single suspension and a
single resumption option is available is lower than that with an investment opportunity with a
single abandonment option.
Proof: The FONC that yield the optimal investment thresholds are:
¯2

























Subtracting these two equations we have:
¯2
1− ¯2 − °
[
P 1∗¿1














1−° − P 2∗¿1
1−°
=
(1− ¯2 − °)(¯1 − ¯2)
¯1¯2

















, the right-hand side of (71) is
negative indicating that:
P 1∗¿1
1−° − P 2∗¿1
1−°
> 0 ⇒ P 1∗¿1 > P 2∗¿1 (74)
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